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FAIR LENDING 2.0: A BORROWER-BASED SOLUTION TO
DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING
Jared Ruiz Bybee*
Fairlending laws promise that borrowers with similar credit profiles will receive
similar loan products-regardlessof their race. Yet, studies reveal that black and
Latino borrowers consistently receive loan products that are inferior to those of
white borrowers with similar credit characteristics.Despite frequent amendments
since their passage during the Civil Rights Era, the Fair Lending Laws that
opened doors for minority borrowers are unable to root out the subtle discrimination that persists in today's mortgage lending market. These traditional Fair
Lending Laws are built on an outdated framework that focuses exclusively on
punishing lenders and rightingpast wrongs. This Article proposes a new borrower-based approach to solving the problem of discrimination in lending. This new
framework gives borrowers the tools to effectively understand and compare loan offers, reduces the complexity of loan products, and enhances the ability of borrowers
to receive loan offers from a variety of potential lenders. This Article also provides
examples of tools derived from the new borrower-basedapproach that may take us
the last mile toward a truefair lending environment.

INTRODUCTION

The data from the recent mortgage crisis paint a clear and disturbing picture: black borrowers consistently receive inferior
mortgage products when compared to similarly situated white borrowers.' This disparity occurs at every income level, every credit
profile, for prime and subprime loans, and in almost every state in
the country.
The Fair Housing Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and
other Civil Rights Era legislation designed to create racial equality
in lending (Fair Lending Laws) , have opened the door to credit
that was once entirely closed to black and other minority
Academic Fellow, New York University School of Law. J.D., New York University
School of Law; M.A., Brigham Young University; B.A., Brigham Young University. Thanks to
Vicki Been, Lisa Grow Sun, Ron Nell, AndersonJones, and Mehrsa Baradaran, each for their
insightful comments and suggestions.
1.
See Carolina Reid & Elizabeth Laderman, The Untold Costs of Subprime Lending:
Examining the Links among Higher Priced Lending, Foreclosures and Race in California 7
(2009), availableat http://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs/ReidPaper.pdf.
Id.
2.
3.
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and Community Reinvestment Act were not
passed with the express intention of remedying racial discrimination in lending. However,
these laws are consistently employed to bring about that result, and are thus often considered part of the Fair Lending Laws.
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borrowers. No longer are black and minority borrowers explicitly
denied service by lenders, and seldom do lenders explicitly treat
minority borrowers differently from white borrowers. Certainly,
these Civil Rights Era laws have provided greater access to lending
institutions and products; however, they have fallen short of ensuring parity in lending because of two significant weaknesses. First,
Fair Lending Laws focus only on restricting and punishing the
lender rather than empowering the borrower. Second, these laws
address only past instances in which harm has already occurred,
rather than providing tools to identify and avoid discriminatory
loans from the outset. As a result, minority borrowers consistently
purchase inferior and more expensive loan products than similarly
situated white borrowers.
The existing Fair Lending Laws are based on an outdated approach to remedying overt discrimination that is ill-suited for
solving today's persistent and subtle discrimination. These Fair
Lending Laws rely on regulation and reporting requirements for
lenders and create causes of action that empower government
agencies and private citizens to sue if lenders violate the laws and
regulations. This approach focuses entirely on restricting and punishing lenders. As a result, the existing Fair Lending Laws often
leave minority borrowers with little recourse other than to wait for
lenders to change their discriminatory behavior.
Each of the Fair Lending Laws has undergone amendments and
other adjustments-including significant changes made in July
2010 as a part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). Despite these changes, the
existing Fair Lending Laws perpetuate a backward-looking and reactionary approach to ending discrimination in lending. Their
lender-focused methods remain one step behind new loan products and finance processes that create new forms of discrimination.
Until legislation moves beyond this outdated approach, lending
discrimination will remain a permanent part of the home-lending
market.
Given both the inability of the Fair Lending Laws to provide a
discrimination-free lending environment and the country's recovery from a historic housing and mortgage crisis, this Article argues
that it is time to rethink the way we lend. We need an approach to
mortgage lending that empowers borrowers to make educated and
4.
See Vikas Bajaj & Ford Fessenden, What's Behind the Race Gap?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2007, at D16.
5.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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rational decisions about the kinds of loans they buy, rather than
simply waiting for lenders to police their own behavior. By providing more information to borrowers, producing simpler loans, and
increasing competition, a borrower-based approach to fair lending
will ensure that the loans are based on default risk rather than on
race.
For most consumer purchases there are a variety of tools a buyer
may use to better understand products and compare prices. There
are numerous magazines, websites, and smartphone applications to
help buyers learn about cars, televisions, or toasters and to then
find the product that best meets their needs at the most competitive price. Taking out a home mortgage is one of the most
important transactions an individual may engage in and yet in
comparison to consumer products, borrowers of all races lack adequate tools to distinguish between a bad deal and a good one. In
response, this Article proposes an innovative, borrower-based conception of fair lending that empowers borrowers by increasing
access to a variety of lenders, reducing the complexity of loan
products, and enabling borrowers to easily understand and compare loan offers. This borrower-based approach, combined with
tools developed out of this framework, has the potential to finally
close the gap between black and white borrowers.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I presents evidence that
the existing Fair Lending Laws have failed to achieve fairness in
lending. Volumes of research document the same unsettling result:
a borrower's race or the racial makeup of a borrower's neighborhood is a significant determinant of the loan the borrower will
receive. Part II discusses the current Fair Lending Laws and presents a brief history and description of each relevant law.
Additionally, this Part addresses why these laws are incapable of
resolving modern day discrimination in lending and explains why
the result is continuing disparate impact for minority borrowers.
Part III explores the changes brought about by Dodd-Frank, the
latest attempt to make fair lending work. This Part also explains
how recent reforms perpetuate the existing lender-focused approach and why Dodd-Frank will not eliminate discriminatory
lending. Part IV discusses a new borrower-based approach to fair
lending and discusses how this approach will reduce discrimination
by enabling borrowers to shop for a loan more effectively and
by encouraging competition among lenders. This Part also
Magazines such as Consumer Reports and a variety of websites offering reviews,
6.
opinions, and prices, such as Google Product Search, help consumers research and select
products.
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proposes specific tools to implement the new borrower-based approach, for example, an innovative Loan Comparison Report.
Ultimately, the Article concludes that racial discrimination in lending will persist without laws that create a borrower-based approach
to home mortgage lending.
I.

EXISTING FAIR LENDING LAWs HAVE NOT
ELIMINATED DISCRIMINATION

Today, researchers have more complete data on borrowers and
loan products than ever before, and they are also better able to use
this data to draw conclusions on the state of residential mortgage
lending. The bulk of the data comes from the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA), described further in Part II. HMDA data
are sufficient to identify trends in mortgage lending and, when
combined with other local or specialized data, can identify patterns
of racial discrimination.
The HDMA data demonstrate the persistence of discrimination
in lending, which is compelling evidence that current Fair Lending
Laws are not creating a race-neutral lending market. Part I provides a variety of evidence of continued racial discrimination in
lending, including studies of the connection between race and inferior loan products.

A. CorrelationBetween a Borrower's Race and Likelihood
of Receiving a Subprime Loan

Several studies have observed correlations between a borrower's
race and the type of loan products she receives. For example, a
study of HMDA data from the years 1998, 2002, and 2006 that contained information from more than 46 million mortgage
applications illustrates subprime lending behavior for both white
and black borrowers.! The study found that in every state, black
7.
The HMDA requires lenders to record and periodically report specific information
on each loan application that they receive, including the type of loan, purpose of loan, dollar amount, the census tract where the property is located, and whether the application was
approved or denied. Demographic data about the borrower is also recorded; including income, gender, and race or ethnicity. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a) (2010). See also FED. FIN. INSTS.
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, A GUIDE To HMDA REPORTING C-4, C-5 (2010), available at

http://www.ffiec.gov/Hmda/pdf/2010guide.pdf.
8.
Carol Necole Brown, Intent and Empirics: Race to the Subprime, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 907,
928-0 (2010). Subprime lending generally refers to loans made to individuals that would
not qualify under traditional underwriting criteria, such loans containing higher interest
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borrowers applied for loans from subprime lenders more frequently than whites.9 Lenders also accepted subprime applications from
black borrowers at higher rates than white borrowers." Although a
rational, discrimination-free lender would approve any loan that it
could justifiably underwrite, regardless of race, this research indicates that in most states, whether a borrower was black had a
"positive, statistically significant effect on whether a lender approved a subprime loan.""
The correlation between a borrower's race and the likelihood of
receiving a subprime loan is independently troubling. However,
the research also shows that race is a factor in determining the
loan a borrower receives, even after controlling for other underwriting variables. When income, house value, area median income,
the percentage of owner-occupied homes, and the percentage of
residents within a particular census tract who are minorities are
held constant, "black applicants are more likely to be approved for
a loan from a subprime lender than are white applicants."" This
result indicates that racial discrimination remains a real part of the
lending process.
The research also shows that the strength of race as a determinative factor grew between 1998 and 2006.'1 During this period,
neighborhood median income, the percentage of homes occupied
by their owner (rather than rented to a tenant), and a borrower's
income level have all become less significant indicators that a borrower will receive a subprime loan. 14 However, during the same
time period, "the substantive effect of the borrower's race grew
...

,

suggesting that black borrowers are bearing the true brunt of

the subprime market." 5
All income levels experience racial discrimination in lending.
Differences between the loans offered to black and white borrowers become more pronounced when comparing low and middleincome (LMI) black borrowers to middle and upper-income
(MUI) black borrowers." A borrower's income can be used as an
and more onerous terms than traditional loans to compensate lenders for the additional
risk.
9.
Id. at 928.
10.
Id.
11.
Id. at 934.
12.
Id. at 936.
13.
Id. at 938-39.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
NAT'L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., INCOME IS No SHIELD AGAINST RACIAL DIFFERENCE IN LENDING: A COMPARISON OF HIGH-COST LENDING IN AMERICA'S METROPOLITAN
AREAS
4 (2007), available at http://ncrc.org/images/stories/mediaCenter reports/
ncrc%20metro%20study%20race%20and%20income%20disparity%20july%2007.pdf.
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inexact proxy for creditworthiness to compare similarly situated
borrowers and to reveal the effect of a borrower's race. For example, researchers compared borrowers at similar income levels and
identified the metropolitan areas across the country where black
borrowers were more than twice as likely as white borrowers to receive subprime loans. The results revealed that LMI black
borrowers were twice as likely to receive subprime loans as their
white counterparts in each of seventy metropolitan areas, while in
167 metropolitan areas, MUI black borrowers were twice as likely as
white borrowers to receive a subprime loan. It is especially concerning that a large percentage of the total number of loans given
to MUI black borrowers were subprime loans. In 159 metropolitan
areas, more than 40 percent of the loans MUI black borrowers received were subprime.' 8 Although this study did not consider
borrower and loan characteristics necessary to prove racial discrimination, such as credit scores and loan-to-value and debt-to-income
ratios, the results do indicate a strong likelihood that racial bias
influenced the loan decisions. This study also illustrates the need
for analysis of more complete borrower and loan data in order to
fully understand the cause of these disparities.
B. CorrelationBetween the RacialMakeup of a Neighborhood and the
Likelihood of Receiving a Subprime Loan

Research also shows that the loan product a borrower receives
closely correlates with the neighborhood where the mortgaged
property is located. A study by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development found differences in the rates of subprime lending in predominantly black neighborhoods." In
predominantly black neighborhoods, the study determined that
"subprime lending accounted for 51 percent of home loans in
1998-compared with only 9 percent in predominately white areas."20 Subprime refinance mortgages accounted for only one-tenth
of the refinance mortgages in predominantly white neighborhoods, but in predominantly black neighborhoods, half of the
refinance mortgages were subprime." These data indicate that
17.
18.
19.
PARITIES

Id. at 5.
Id.
U.S. DEP'T OF Hous.

Disavailable at www.huduser.org/

& URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME AND RACIAL

IN SUBPRIME LENDING

Publications/pdf/unequal-full.pdf.
20.
Id. at 2.
21.
Id. at 4.

IN

AMERICA

1 (1999),

FALL

2011 ]

FairLending 2.0

119

"only one in ten families in white neighborhoods pay higher fees
and interest rates" while "five in ten families in African-American
communities are saddled with higher rates and costs." 22
The study also found a dramatic difference in subprime lending
when comparing black and white neighborhoods at similar income
levels. Only six percent of homeowners living in upper-income
white neighborhoods borrowed from subprime lenders, compared
to 39 percent of homeowners living in upper-income black neighborhoods. As neighborhood income increases, the disparity
between the black and white neighborhoods also grows. Homeowners in low-income black communities are almost three times as
likely as homeowners in low-income white communities to rely on
subprime refinancing, and black moderate-income neighborhoods are four times as likely to rely on subprime refinancing as
comparable white neighborhoods. Black upper-income neighborhoods are six times as likely to rely on subprime financing as
comparable white neighborhoods. Using income as a rough indicator of creditworthiness we should expect few, if any, subprime
loans among upper income homeowners, or at very least, similar
rates of subprime lending among black and white borrowers. However, the fact that the prevalence of subprime lending among black
borrowers as compared to white borrowers increases as income increases indicates that, at a minimum, subprime lending is not blind
to race. It may also indicate that when making a loan some banks
consider race rather than relying solely on income and other creditworthiness factors.
C. StatisticalEvidence of RacialDiscriminationin Lending
To prove racial discrimination, rather than to show mere correlations between race and loan products, creditworthiness data are
essential. Historically, HMDA or other readily accessible databases
have not collected creditworthiness data. Thus, where obtainable,
researchers have supplemented HMDA data with additional creditworthiness data to examine the influence of race on lending.
For example, researchers supplemented 2004 HMDA data with
credit scores and other relevant loan underwriting variables taken

22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
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from a proprietary database. They found that after controlling for
mortgage-product type, credit score, loan-to-value ratio, and other
variables, black borrowers were up to 34.3 percent more likely than
white borrowers to receive a high-interest-rate-subprime mortgage,
and Latinos were up to 44.6 percent more likely than white borrowers to receive a mortgage with a higher interest rate." A
particularly troubling picture emerged when the researchers examined borrowers with high credit scores and marginal loan-to-value
ratios. Such borrowers should qualify for prime loan products;
however, the study found that 21.3 percent of black borrowers with
high credit scores and marginal loan-to-value ratios received subprime loans, compared with 14.5 percent of Latino and only 7.5
percent of white borrowers with similar profiles."
Another method of detecting discrimination is to calculate the
percentage of a borrower's interest rate determined by race as opposed to other legitimate borrower risk characteristics, including
credit score, loan-to-value ratio, and debt-to-income ratio. Proprietary loan data from 2004 and 2005 from a large group of
borrowers indicate that black borrowers paid mortgage interest
rates 1.28 percent higher, and Latino borrowers up to 0.74 percent
higher, than those paid by white borrowers.31 These data provide
further proof that racial discrimination affects the loan products
that racial minorities receive.
A study of ten metropolitan areas that included creditworthiness
data also shows that the racial composition of the neighborhood
affects the amount of subprime lending. Controlling for creditworthiness, the study found that in nine of the ten metropolitan
areas " [t]he level of refinance subprime lending increased as the
portion of African-Americans in a neighborhood increased." The
data reveal that in six of the metropolitan areas, an increase in the

26.

DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, KEITH

S.

ERNST & WEl Li, UNFAIR LENDING: THE

3 (2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/rr01 1UnfairLending-0506.pdf.
27.
Id. at 17-18.
Loan-to-value ratio indicates what percentage of a mortgaged property's total cost
28.
will be borrowed from the lender. The higher a loan-to-value ratio, the more risky a loan is
to a lender. As this number increases it is also more likely that it will be a subprime loan.
29.
BOCIAN, ERNST & LI, supra note 26, at 11.
See Marsha J. Courchane, The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans to Minority Borrowers:
30.
How Much of the APR Differential Can We Explain?, 29J. REAL EST. REs. 399 (2007).
31.
Id. at 405.
NAT'L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., THE BROKEN CREDIT SYSTEM: DISCRIMINATION
32.
AND UNEQUAL ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE LOANS BY RACE AND AGE 7 (2003), available at
http://ncrc.org/images/stories/pdf/research/ncrcdiscrimstudy.pdf.
EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES
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African-American composition of a neighborhood boosted the
amount of subprime lending.
Taken together, these studies indicate that borrowers in majority
black neighborhoods consistently receive more unfavorable loan
products than borrowers in white neighborhoods, despite comparable creditworthiness.
D. The GreatestPredictorof Mortgage Foreclosurein New York City Is
Whether a Home Is Located in a Black Neighborhood
Race also accounts for other disparities in lending, particularly
the rate of mortgage default and foreclosure. Researchers from
New York University's Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban
Policy performed a study that merged HMDA data with a commercial database of non-prime mortgage performance statistics along
with the specific geographic locations of mortgaged properties in
New York City.34 The results showed that in New York City, after
controlling for loan and borrower characteristics-including interest rate paid, borrower credit score, and race-mortgage holders
in predominantly black neighborhoods "have a substantially higher
chance of falling behind on their mortgages" regardless of the borrower's own race.35 This research indicates that some aspect of the
loans sold to borrowers living in predominantly black neighborhoods makes such loans, regardless of whether the borrowers are
black or white, more likely to default.
The Furman study also concluded that for borrowers in census
tracts that are over 80 percent black, the likelihood of default "is
over 25 percent higher than that of borrowers in tracts with fewer
than 20 percent black residents." 6 By comparison, when analyzing
only the race of the borrower, rather than the racial make up of
the neighborhood, and controlling for other loan and borrower

33.
Id. Additionally, the research found that age had an effect similar to race on the
rate of subprime lending, after controlling for creditworthiness. "In seven metropolitan
areas, the portion of subprime refinance lending increased solely when the number of residents over 65 increased in a neighborhood." Id. Discrimination based on the age of
borrowers is prohibited by the Fair Housing Act. Although age discrimination in lending is
not the focus of this paper, many of the remedies proposed to address racial discrimination
in lending may also help prevent discrimination based on age.
34.
Sewin Chan, Michael Gedal, Vicki Been & Andrew Haughwout, The Role of Neighborhood Characteristicsin Mortgage Default Risk: Evidence from New York City 2 (Furman Ctr. for
Real Estate & Pub. Policy, Working Paper, 2010).
35.
Id. at 3.
36.
Id. at 20-21.
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characteristics, 7 the study found that the likelihood of default is
only 10 percent higher for black borrowers than white borrowers."
In sum, the study indicates that in New York City, the question of
whether a subprime mortgaged property is located in a predominantly black neighborhood "is as important in explaining default
as the borrower's own race."3 9 The researchers hypothesize that the
most likely explanation for their findings is that the non-prime
mortgage industry treats "black neighborhoods differently in terms
of marketing and underwriting practices or loan terms."40 Although this study focused exclusively on New York City, the results
indicate that lenders are discriminating against all borrowers that
live in New York City's majority black neighborhoods, regardless of
the borrower's own race, a pattern that may be repeated across the
country.

E. Mystery Shopping Data CorroborateEvidence ofDiscrimination

In addition to the empirical data, qualitative data also corroborate the evidence of disparate treatment and discriminatory loan
pricing for black borrowers. For example, the National Community
Reinvestment Organization (NCRO) conducted "mystery shopping" tests of eighty-four large and small mortgage broker
companies. NCRO sent white, black, and Latino testers to meet
with or call brokers to inquire about loan products. 4 1 The black
and Latino testers were given more attractive borrower profiles
with regard to equity, credit standing, and employment than the
white testers.
Despite these borrower profiles that made the minority testers
more amenable to receiving loans, the testing showed that in 46
percent of the interactions with lenders, minority testers received
less favorable treatment.43 Specifically, 25 percent of the time black
37.
Loan and borrower characteristics controlled for include loan amount, initial interest rate at closing and at the first adjustment, credit score, debt-to-income ratio, loan-tovalue ratio, whether the borrower took on additional debt, whether the borrower provided
full documentation to support her loan application, and whether there was a co-borrower.

38.
39.
40.
41.

Chan, Gedal, Been & Haughwout, supranote 34, at 21.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 29.
NAT'L CrTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., TESTIMONY OF JOHN

TAYLOR BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE, ROOTING OUr DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING: USING
FOR FAIR LENDING ENFORCEMENT 7

mediaCentertestimony/ncrc testreg-oversight hearing-finsvs

42.
43.

Id. at 8.
Id.

HMDA

AS A

TOOL

(2007), available at http://ncrc.org/images/stories/

july

07%282%29.pdf.
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and Latino testers were discouraged from obtaining credit all together, although white testers were discouraged only 12 percent of
the time." Additionally, "[blacks] and Latinos were questioned
about their credit over 32% of the time" while "[w]hite shoppers
were only questioned about credit 13% of the time."" White shoppers also received two interest rate quotes for every one quote
received by black and Latino shoppers.46 Twenty five percent of the
tests showed pricing discrimination.4 1 Sixty-two percent of white
testers, compared to only 35 percent of black and Latino testers,
received full disclosure of all mortgage costs, including fees.4 ' Finally, lenders discussed fixed rate loans with 77 percent of the
white testers, but only 50 percent of the black and Latino testers.
The qualitative evidence from mystery shopper studies illustrates
that racial discrimination remains prevalent in mortgage lending.
F Testimony ofFormer Lenders CorroboratesEvidence of "Steering" and
Racial Discrimination
Evidence from inside the lending industry bolsters the above
claims that lenders discriminate against minority borrowers. The
testimony of former Wells Fargo loan officers, Elizabeth Jacobson
and Tony Paschal-as part of a lawsuit brought by the City of Baltimore alleging racial discrimination in mortgage lendingprovides insight into Wells Fargo's lending practices. 0 While the
suit was eventually dismissed because of the city's inability to show a
causal connection between Wells Fargo's lending practices and Baltimore's loss in property tax revenue,1 the former loan officers'
testimony remains an important insider account of discriminatory
and questionable loan practices and raises questions about the entire industry.

44.
Id.
45.
Id.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
See Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Mayor v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 1:08-CV-00062-JFM (D. Md. Apr. 7, 2010), 2009 WL
3100269.
Edvard Pettersson, Wells Fargo Wins Dismissal of Baltimore's Suit Over Subprime Foreclo51.
sures, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2010, 7:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0914/wells-fargo-wins-dismissal-of-baltimore-s-suit-over-subprime-foreclosures.html.
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Other cities and organizations, including the city of Birmingham, Alabama,12 the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People in Los Angeles, and the state of Illinois on behalf
of the city of Chicago, have filed similar suits against mortgage
lenders. These suits allege that the discriminatory steering of minority borrowers toward subprime loans resulted in significant
losses of homeowner equity and property tax revenue. However,
none of these suits provided similar testimony by former employees regarding the inner working of a lender as in the Wells Fargo
case.
In the Wells Fargo case, the former employees alleged that Wells
Fargo targeted black borrowers and black neighborhoods in Baltimore and elsewhere for subprime loans and that Wells Fargo
employees relied on a range of deceptive and predatory practices
aimed at minority communities.1 Specifically, the former employees alleged that Wells Fargo marketed subprime products in
predominantly African-American zip codes and targeted subprime
marketing at African-American churches." The employees also alleged that the lender tailored its subprime marketing materials
based on race, even creating "software to print out subprime promotional materials in different languages, one of which was called
'African American.' "57
The employees also described how Wells Fargo gave loan officers
significant financial incentives for closing subprime loans and allowed employees to steer minority borrowers to subprime loan
products." For example, Paschal stated that he saw many "minority
customers who had good credit scores and credit characteristics in
subprime loans who should have qualified for prime or FHA
loans." 59 Similarly, Jacobsen claimed that "[loan officers] who made
prime loans generally made more money in referral fees by referring a person with prime credit to a subprime loan officer than by
originating a prime loan.""
52.
See City of Birmingham v. Citigroup Inc., No. CV-90-BE-467-S, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 123123 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2009).
53.
See Nat'1 Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Ameriquest Mortgage
Co., 635 F. Supp.2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
54.
See Complaint, People v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 09 CH 26434 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jul. 31
2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/unreported/WellsFargoIllinois.pdf.
55.
Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at
27-28, Mayor v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 1:08-CV-00062-JFM (D. Md. Apr. 7, 2010), 2009 WL
3100269.
56.
Id. at 21.
57.
Id. at 31.
58.
Id. at 32.
59.
Id. at 24.
60.
Id.
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Although subprime lending may have a legitimate place within
the American mortgage lending landscape, the strategy to maximize profit by aggressively marketing and selling subprime loans in
black neighborhoods likely resulted in significant racial discrimination. The employees' testimony also illustrates the willingness of
individual loan officers to maximize their own financial gain by
closing as many subprime loans as possible-regardless of whether
the borrower could qualify for a prime loan product or should not
have qualified for a loan at all.
G. MinoritiesAccess Home Loans through More Expensive Channels
Other research indicates that discrimination in mortgage lending is not solely the result of overt racial bias on the part of
individual mortgage brokers or bank lending agents, but is also
caused by the fact that minority borrowers access loans through
channels that preclude the most competitive rates and terms.'
Low-cost channels for obtaining a home mortgage loan include
national banks that provide both prime and subprime products.
High-cost channels include mortgage brokers and mortgage lending companies that deal exclusively in subprime loan products.
The fact that minority borrowers are far more likely to receive
loans through less regulated and higher priced channels than
white borrowers is an effect known as "channeling."6 2 Channeling is
caused by a borrower's inability to gather the information needed
to shop for the best loan offer. Research indicates that one of the
main reasons minorities pay higher mortgage rates is that minority
borrowers are more likely to receive a mortgage through a broker
than directly from a lender." Estimates indicate that between onehalf and two-thirds of the difference in the price of loan products
that minority borrowers receive is a result of receiving loans from
high-cost subprime lenders.65 Explanations for why a minority borrower is more likely to use higher priced lenders include a distrust
of banks, a lack of access to traditional banks, and a preference for

61.
Alan M. White, Borrowing While Black: Applying FairLending Laws to Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing,60 S.C. L. REV. 677 (2009).
62.
Id. at 687.
63.
See generally id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
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and willingness to trust mortgage lenders that are already known
and active within a community.66
The presence of channeling raises significant concerns about
the ability of the Fair Lending Laws to create a race-neutral lending marketplace. Although Fair Lending Laws have made
significant headway towards creating a lending environment that is
fairer than the environment before the Civil Rights Era, the evithat
racial
overwhelmingly
indicates
dence
discussed
discrimination remains pervasive throughout the lending market.
II.

CURRENT FAIR LENDING LAWS CANNOT END DISCRIMINATION

The discrimination in lending discussed in Part I persists because the current Fair Lending Laws are based on an outdated
model for regulating and redressing racial discrimination. Such an
approach was essential during the Civil Rights Era when racial minorities were routinely excluded from many aspects of life,
including participation in competitive home mortgage lending.1
At that time, racial exclusion was blatant and egregious, and, as a
result, laws were designed to respond to this explicit discrimination. For example, the 1968 Fair Housing Act (FHA)6" and the
1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)" prohibit racial discrimination in lending and provide borrowers with a private right
of action to sue lenders. The HMDA, passed in 1975, requires
banks to disclose information about mortgage loan applications in
an effort to identify discrimination in lending.o The Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA), passed in 1977, gives regulators the ability to prevent bank expansion if a bank does not open up lending
to black neighborhoods.7 ' Each of these Fair Lending Laws was a
direct product of the Civil Rights Era, and sought to provide the
means to regulate lending and eliminate racial discrimination. The
sections below discuss each law in greater detail and indicate why
these laws remain unable to address modern day racial discrimination.

66.
Id. "Channeling" may also work in tandem with the "steering" discussed above,
whereby even those minority borrowers able to avoid high priced channels are steered back
toward the same high priced products due to race.
67.
See Guy STUART, DISCRIMINATING RISK: THE U.S. MORTGAGE LENDING INDUSTRY
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 10 (2003).
68.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2006).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2006).
69.
70.
12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10(2006).
71.
12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (2006).
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A. The Home MortgageDisclosureAct
HMDA was enacted in 1975 to provide the public with loan data
that can be used:
(i) To help determine whether financial institutions are serving the housing needs of their communities; (ii) To assist
public officials in distributing public-sector investment so as to
attract private investment to areas where it is needed; and (iii)
To assist in identifying possible discriminatory lending pat72
terns and enforcing antidiscrimination statutes.
HMDA was designed to be temporary and to expire in June 1980;
however, this date was later extended to 1985, and HDMA was
made permanent in 1987." HMDA has also undergone a number
of minor changes to update the form and method of disclosure, as
well as the types of institutions that are required to make disclo74
sures.
HMDA does not create a cause of action like FHA, as discussed
below; rather it only requires disclosure of specific information regarding institutions' lending activities and instead relies on public
and regulatory scrutiny of this information to encourage fair lending. The FHA permits suits based on disparate impact, and
HMDA data is consistently a critical tool in proving such discrimination.76
Financial institutions covered by HMDA are required to "collect
data regarding applications for, and originations and purchases of,
home purchase loans, home improvement loans, and refinancings"
each calendar year. Most importantly, HDMA also requires banks
72.
73.
74.

12 C.F.R.

§ 203.1(b)

(2010).

MATTHEW BENDER, 8-157 BANKING LAW § 157.02.
See, e.g, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REGULATIONS:
RECENT REGULATORY AMENDMENTS, http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/reghist.htm#C.
75.
MATTHEW BENDER, 8-157 BANKING LAW § 157.03.

76.
See generally id.
77.
12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a) (2010). See also FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, sUifra
note 7, at C-4, C-5.
The data recorded shall include the following items: (1) An identifying number for
the loan or loan application, and the date the application was received. (2) The type
of loan or application. (3) The purpose of the loan or application. (4) Whether the
application is a request for preapproval and whether it resulted in a denial or in an
origination. (5) The property type to which the loan or application relates. (6) The
owner-occupancy status of the property to which the loan or application relates. (7)
The amount of the loan or the amount applied for. (8) The type of action taken, and

the date. (9) The location of the property to which the loan or application relates, by
metropolitan area, state, county, and tract, if the institution has a home or branch
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to report borrower demographics including ethnicity, race, sex,
and income, 8 general loan characteristics, and the geographic location of the mortgaged property. 9
Despite the amount of data available through HMDA, significant
information deficits remain. This lack of data can impede a plaintiff from successfully proving a clear connection between a
protected class and a racially discriminatory loan or loan denial. In
addition to borrower demographics, plaintiffs need the specific
creditworthiness characteristics of each borrower so that an accurate comparison of similarly situated borrowers can be made, and
so that race-or membership in any other protected class-can be
isolated as a determinative variable of what loan is received. Absence of creditworthiness information precludes a finding of
discrimination based on HMDA data alone. Additionally, HMDA
information is consistently anywhere from several months to more
than a year old. This time lag limits the usefulness of this information solely to backward looking analyses, as HDMA data cannot
provide an instant picture of the home lending environment.
Such a lapse in time is unnecessary given modern technological
capabilities and should be reduced.
Dodd-Frank, discussed in Part III, updates HMDA disclosure requirements in an attempt to make it easier to prove racial
discrimination in lending. However, HMDA's true capacity to promote fair lending is only as powerful as the FHA, because FHA
provides the requisite cause of action. Unfortunately, as explained
below, even with updated HDMA data the law will remain unable
to provide lending free from discrimination.

office in that metropolitan area. (10) The ethnicity, race, and sex of the applicant or
borrower, and the gross annual income relied on in processing the application. (11)
The type of entity purchasing a loan that the institution originates or purchases and
then sells within the same calendar year .... (12)(i) For [certain loans], the difference between the loan's annual percentage rate (APR) and the average prime offer
rate for a comparable transaction as of the date the interest rate is set, if [it is above a
certain amount] .... (13) Whether the loan is subject to the Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act of 1994, as implemented in Regulation Z (12 CFR 226.32). (14)
The lien status of the loan or application (first lien, subordinate lien, or not secured
by a lien on a dwelling).
Id.
78.
79.
80.

With the exception of loans purchased by the financial institution. Id. at C-5.
See id. at 8.
See id. at 2.
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B. The FairHousingAct

When the Federal Housing Act was passed as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, racial discrimination in housing was prevalent.
Blacks were excluded from many neighborhoods and deprived of
housing opportunities by landlords and brokers."' Covenants running with the land precluded real estate owners from selling to
black families, keeping black homeowners out of majority-white
neighborhoods. 2 In a discriminatory practice known as "redlining," banks drew a red line on a map around majority-black
neighborhoods and refused to lend to any borrower within that
area.83 As a result, minority borrowers were relegated to predatory
and unscrupulous lenders who peddled loan products designed
both to strip equity and lead to foreclosure.
FHA sought to put all borrowers and homeowners on equal foot5 FHA prohibits, among other things, discrimination in the
ing."
sale, rental, or marketing of housing based on a person's race, religion, national origin, disability or family status." Although the law
protects members of other classes that often faced housing discrimination, such as attempts to exclude families, in practice the
exclusion of blacks and other minorities from housing opportunities remains the most important and most litigated aspect of the
FHA.87
Most relevant to this Article is FHA's prohibition on discrimination in mortgage lending. FHA explicitly prohibits "any person or
other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real
estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in
making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions
81.
82.
83.

supra note 67, at 10.
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1948).
See generally BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES:

STUART,

HOW THE STRUGGLE OVER RACE

(2009).
Id.
84.
85.
See 114 CONG. REc. 2526 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke) (noting that African
Americans are "surrounded by a pattern of discrimination based on individual prejudice,
often institutionalized by business and industry, and Government practice" and the Act seeks
to eliminate this discrimination in those areas).
86.
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
87.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-75, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE: INFORAND REAL ESTATE TRANSFORMED CHICAGO AND URBAN AMERICA

MATION

ON

EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, HOUSING AND

CIVIL ENFORCEMENT, VOTING AND

2001 THROUGH
2007 43 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1075.pdf (finding that 44 percent of the cases under FHA deal with racial discrimination-more than any other
category). In 1974, Congress also passed Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) to forbid
discrimination in a variety of credit-based transactions, including mortgage loans. In the
mortgage lending context the ECOA contains rights parallel to the FHA and the majority of
discrimination suits are initiated under the FHA rather than the ECOA.
SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTIONS' ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS FROM FISCAL YEARS
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of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin."'8 Included in the definition
of "residential real estate-related transaction" is "the making or
purchasing of loans ... for purchasing, constructing, improving,

repairing, or maintaining a dwelling" or loans that are "secured by
residential real estate.""
Claims brought by aggrieved borrowers under FHA typically allege one of three violations: "overt discrimination," in which a
lender refuses to make a loan to a borrower based on her race;
"disparate treatment," in which the plaintiff alleges she was treated
differently because of her race (for example, a black borrower who
received inferior loan terms to a white borrower);9o or "disparate
impact,"9 where a facially neutral lending policy has a dispropor-

tionate adverse effect on a protected class. In the early days of
FHA, the majority of the litigated cases dealt with overt discrimination and disparate treatment of borrowers,92 but today the majority
of FHA claims are made under the theory of disparate impact.93
Claims of overt discrimination and disparate treatment are contained within the explicit language of FHA. In contrast, whether a
disparate impact claim can be made under FHA was left to the
courts. The Supreme Court has never directly ruled on whether
FHA permits disparate impact claims. However, there is overwhelming consensus among the lower courts allowing disparate
and interpretation of the statute by the
impact claims,
88.
89.
90.

42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 3605(b) (2006).
See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., SIDE

91.
92.

Id.
See

BY SIDE: A GUIDE TO FAIR LENDING 23 (1996),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/side/side.pdf.
WILLIAM C. APGAR & ALLEGRA CALDER, THE DUAL MORTGAGE MARKET: THE
PERSISTENCE OF DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING 12 (2005) ("Discrimination in
housing and mortgage markets is more subtle today...."), available at http://mvw.jchs.harvard.edu/
publications/finance/w05-1 l.pdf.

93.
See Vern McKinley, Community Reinvestment Act: Ensuring CreditAdequacy or Enforcing
Credit Allocation?, 17 REG. 25, 28 (1994).
See NAT'L FAIR Hous. ALLIANCE, DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING
94.
ACT: A PROPOSED APPROACH 3 (2009), available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/
Portals/33/DISPARATE%20IMPACT%20ANALYSIS%2OFINAL.pdf.
See City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 199-200
95.
(2003); Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988). The
Supreme Court avoids the issue of determining whether the Fl-A has a disparate impact
standard.
96.
See NAT'L FAIR Hous. ALLIANCE, supra note 94, at 6-7 (citing Langlois v. Abington
Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000); 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenant's Ass'n v. Dist. of
Columbia, 444 F.3d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (assuming that plaintiffs may bring disparate
impact claim under FHA); Pfaff v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88F.3d 739, 745-46
(9th Cir. 1996); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56
F.3d 1243, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 1995); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty. 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11 Cir.
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Department of Housing and Urban Development-the regulatory
agency charged with enforcing the FHA-firmly establishes that
the FHA contains a disparate impact standard.
To make out a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff
must first factually establish that a lender's facially neutral lending
policy has a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected class."
Frequently the disproportionate adverse effect is established
through statistical analysis of a particular lending practice and its
effect on applicants or potential applicants. For example, statistical
analysis has been used to prove that yield spread premiums, which
are commission bonuses given to mortgage brokers who convince
borrowers to accept higher interest rates, are more consistently
included in loans given to black borrowers than white borrowers."
Discriminatory intent is not required to make a disparate impact
claim; the plaintiff need only establish that the policy results in a
disparate outcome for minority borrowers."o In an early disparate
impact appellate decision, the Eighth Circuit held that proof of
discriminatory intent is not required because "effect and not motivation, is the touchstone" of discrimination and "clever men may
easily conceal their motivations."' 0 ' The Court also "firmly recognize [d] that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as
disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the
perversity of a willful scheme."' Once the plaintiff has established
that the practice has a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected class, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the
policy is justified. The defendant must prove that the practice
1994); Huntington Branch NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-35 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd
per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Hanson v. Veterans Admin. 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir.
1986); Arthur v. Toledo, Ohio, 782 F.2d 565, 574, 75 (6th Cir. 1986); Betsey v. Turtle Creek
Assocs., 736 F. 2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1984); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146148 (3d Cir. 1977); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th
Cir. 1977); United States v. BlackJack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974)).
See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., INTERAGENCY POLICY STATEMENT ON DISCRIMINA97.
TION IN LENDING, available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-3860.html.
See also Erin Elisabeth Dancy, Latimore v. Citibank Federal Savings Bank: A journey through the
Labyrinth of Lending Discrimination,3 N.C. BANKING INST. 233, 241-42 (1999) ("Although the
Policy Statement purports to provide guidance and establish a clear standard for banking
institutions to follow, the Policy Statement does not confer any substantive or procedural
rights that a court could enforce in an administrative or civil proceeding. Thus, without any
federal enforcement power, litigation of these issues persists, feeding the controversy as to
the appropriate standard by which to judge credit discrimination cases."); Peter P. Swire, The
Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination:A Law and Economic Analysis, 73 TEx. L. REv. 787
(1995).
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CoRP., supra note 97.
98.
See BOCIAN, ERNST & Li, supra note 26, at 21.
99.
100. See EEOC v. Metal Service Co., 892 F.2d 341, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1990).
101.

United States v. Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974).

102.

Id.
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serves a legitimate "business necessity,"'s and that there is no
alternative non-discriminatory policy that could serve the same
purpose. 104
Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult for a plaintiff to prove
disparate impact. In large part, this is a result of the lack of freely
available lending data. Banks and other lending channels are extremely secretive about their underwriting guidelines, and the
information they are required to disclose under HMDA, as discussed supra, is insufficient to prove disparate impact because it
lacks creditworthiness information. This information gap creates a
barrier to entry for potential litigants. Only those with significant
resources are able to initiate a FHA suit and gather the statistical
data necessary for successful litigation under a disparate impact
theory.'05
Although FHA has reduced discrimination in lending, the law is
inadequate and cannot produce a lending environment that is truly fair. Even if a litigant is successfully able to prove disparate
impact in a particular lending scenario, it is often difficult for others to replicate because lending products are constantly changing
and the fluidity of negotiated terms provides lenders flexibility to
treat one borrower differently from another. 06 As a result, disparate impact litigation will always trail behind the latest
discriminatory methods created by a new loan product or term.
Meanwhile, minority borrowers will continue to bear the cost of
FHA's inability to root out discrimination in lending.

C. The Community Reinvestment Act

Congress enacted CRA in 1977 to ensure access to capital by encouraging "depository institutions to help meet the credit needs of
the communities in which they operate, including low- and moderate-income [LMI] neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound

103. The standard of defendant's burden under an FHA disparate impact claim is debated. See NAT'L FAIR Hous. ALLIANCE, supra note 94, at 21-25.
104. There is some debate as to whether the plaintiff or defendant has the burden to
prove the "less discriminatory alternative," but generally the burden falls to defendant or is
shared by the parties. See id. at 25-26.

105. See PHILIP C. ESCHELS & MARK J. GOMSAK, DEFENDING EMPLOYMENT CASEs: PRETRIAL LITIGATION ISSUES AND STRATEGIES 16 (2008) (explaining in the context of employment
that "[d]isparate impact cases are often complex and expensive, require the use of experts and
involve sophisticated statistical methods."), available at http://pps.americanbar.org/labor/
lel-annualcle/08/materials/data/papers/101.pdf.
106. See APGAR & CALDER, supra note 92, at 1-2.
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Historically, some institutions avoided lendbanking operations.
ing in poor neighborhoods despite having a branch office that
accepted deposits in the same neighborhood. 8 Congress passed
CRA because banks and savings institutions, although privately capitalized, have an underlying "obligation to serve their local
communities," and that such an obligation comes in exchange for
government backing, including the federal deposit insurance that
banks receive.'09
To comply with CRA, banks must undergo a series of tests, which
vary depending on the size of the bank. These tests may include a
lending test to evaluate the number, size, and distribution of loans;
an investment test to measure the dollar amount of community
development investment; and a service test to track the number
and availability of branches and ATMs."' After completing the
CRA examination, banks are given one of four CRA ratings:
Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, or Substantial NonCompliance."' There is little difference-aside, perhaps, from
improved public image-in obtaining an "Outstanding" rather
than a "Satisfactory" rating."' Needs to Improve and Substantial
Non-Compliance are considered failing grades. However, because
CRA lacks enforcement mechanisms to compel lender behavior, a
failing grade can be of little consequence.1
CRA does not provide a civil cause of action, nor do the CRA
regulatory agencies have the authority to impose sanctions directly
on the banks. However, the agencies are required "to publicly disclose certain findings and conclusions regarding lending
institutions, including whether an institution is meeting community needs,""'4 and to consider CRA ratings when evaluating
applications for a new charter, deposit insurance, branch openings,

107. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: BACKGROUND & PURPOSE, http://www.ffiec.gov/CRA/history.htm.
108. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analyis, 79 VA. L. REv. 291, 307--08 (1993); see also 123 CONG. REc. 17603 (1977)
(statement of Sen. Proxmire).

109. Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, But
StrengthenedFederalEnforcement is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 293 (1993).
110. John Taylor & Josh Silver, The Community Reinvestment Act at 30: Looking Back and
Looking to the Future, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 203, 205 (2008).
111. Id.
112. ROBERTO QUERCIA & JANNEKE RATCLIFFE, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT:
OUTSTANDING, AND NEEDS TO IMPROVE 55 (2009), available at http://www.frbsf.org/
publications/community/cra/cra

113.
114.

outstanding.needsimprove.pdf.

Id.
MATHEW BENDER,

1-5 DEBTOR-CREDITOR

LAw

§ 5.01

(2010).

134

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 45:1

branch relocations, and mergers or acquisitions."' Applications by
banks are rarely denied on CRA grounds, but "delays occasionally
occur while a bank answers various questions about its past CRA
performance or makes specific promises to improve CRA performance.""'
Most banks seeking a higher CRA rating have implemented limited "CRA Special Lending Programs.""' The majority of these
programs involve changing the underwriting standards for low and
moderate-income borrowers." 8 These changes include requiring
lower down payments, using alternative measures and/or lower
standards of credit quality, or more liberally assessing repayment
ability through, for example, higher debt ratios or de-emphasizing
employment history."' Although these alternative measures may be
used to qualify borrowers, 93 percent of these institutions describe
these programs as profitable or breakeven.120
The original purpose of CRA was to encourage lending in marginalized communities. From a home mortgage perspective,
however, the CRA's potency in bringing about fair lending has
since dwindled because of the proliferation of alternative avenues
of credit. CRA's jurisdiction is limited to deposit-taking institutions,
as deposits were once the principle source of funds for loans.'2 ' Today's mortgage market, however, consists primarily of non-bank
mortgage lenders who profit by selling mortgages to the secondary
market and are exempt from CRA scrutiny. HMDA data from 2006
indicate that 34 percent of all home loans were made to low and
moderate-income borrowers, but only 10 percent of all loans were
both held by low and moderate-income borrowers and CRA related.'2 2 In other words, 24 percent of all loans are made to low or
moderate-income borrowers by exempt mortgage companies and
unregulated arms of traditional banks outside the reach of the
CRA.' 3
115. Camden C. Betz, Note and Comment, Recent Changes to the Community Reinvestment
Act and Their Impact on Community Banks and Rural Economies, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 157,161
(2006).
116. Taylor & Silver, supranote 110, at 206.
117. QUERCIA & RATCLIFFE, supra note 112, at 49.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Kevin Park, CRA Did Not Cause the Foreclosure Crisis, UNC CENTER FOR COMMUNITY
CAPITAL 1 (2010), available at http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/CRADid Not Cause
ForeclosureCrisis.pdf.
122. REN S. ESSENE & WILLIAM C. APGAR, THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE CRA: RESTRUCTURING THE CRA To ADDRESS THE MORTGAGE FINANCE REVOLUTION 12 (2009),
availableat http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/cra/30thanniversary-cra.pdf.
123. Id.
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It is clear that CRA has not kept pace with the changing
mortgage market, to the detriment of both borrowers and CRAregulated entities alike. As a result, there have been calls for reform and modernization of the law. 24 For example, Essene and
Apgar argue that CRA must provide uniformity for consumers:
[F]undamental fairness suggests that the nature and extent of
federal oversight and consumer protection should not depend on whether a loan application is submitted by a loan
officer working for a CRA-regulated institution or a mortgage
broker working for a nonbank or CRA-regulated bank operating outside its assessment area. Nor should it matter to the
consumer which particular retailer or wholesaler originates
the mortgage, and which secondary market channel is tapped
to secure the investment dollars that ultimately fund the loan.
Instead, all consumers need access to an efficient mortgage
market built on a foundation of uniform and fair regulations
and oversight.
Even a complete overhaul of CRA to allow jurisdiction over every
type of entity that makes mortgage loans would not be adequate to
end racial discrimination in lending. Without effective enforcement mechanisms, CRA's power would remain limited to merely
encouraging certain bank behavior toward borrowers. The problem is not simply that banks need to lend to a greater number of
minority borrowers. Instead, a genuine fair lending environment
requires that lenders offer minority borrowers loans comparable to
similarly situated white borrowers. CRA enforcement, however, is
only equipped to count the number of loans rather than assess
their quality.
E. Existing FairLending Laws Are Insufficient to End
Discriminationin Lending
HMDA, FHA, EOCA, and CRA were all enacted in an era when
minorities were excluded from meaningful participation in the
home lending market. To their credit, each of these laws has
played a role in achieving broad access to home loans for minority
borrowers. The remaining elusive goal of fair lending, however, is
to ensure that minority borrowers receive loan products that are
124.
125.

See generally id.
Id. at 26.
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comparable to those received by similarly situated white borrowers.
As the evidence in Part I indicates, the existing Fair Lending Laws
have proven unable to achieve this goal. This failure occurred for
two reasons. Firstly, these laws are based on an approach that is focused exclusively on lenders and does not empower borrowers.
Secondly, the laws provide tools that can only rectify past wrongs
rather than preventing future discrimination.
1. Fair Lending Laws Are Focused Solely on
Restricting Lenders
The Existing Fair Lending Laws rely on regulation of and litigation against lenders to bring about non-discriminatory lending.
These methods have proved somewhat successful in rooting out
the most blatant forms of discrimination, but have been unable to
curb subtle, though no less harmful forms of discrimination. This
failure is a result of at least two causes. First, lenders are profitseeking entities and discriminating against borrowers can be
profitable when lenders are able to charge interest rates in excess
of the actual credit risk posed by a particular borrower. Lenders
constantly explore new products or processes to maximize profits
within a given regulatory framework.126 A new product will introduce regulatory grey areas as it will be unknown whether it will be
legally classified as discriminatory. In these cases, lenders will err
on the side of profit until required to do otherwise. In many instances, including the recent increase in subprime products,
lenders will discriminate against minority borrowers until forced to
curb a particular practice.m
Secondly, lenders are not monolithic entities that act consistently. Rather, they operate based on the decisions of individual
lending agents such as lending officers and brokers that interact
directly with potential borrowers. To make loans, lenders must
classify borrowers based on credit profiles and other underwriting
information. This process includes some degree of flexibility for
lending agents to make decisions regarding individual borrowers
as they explain products and gather information necessary for underwriting. When exercising this discretion to classify borrowers,
lending officers will express conscious or subconscious subtle preferences or biases such as a preconceived view of the likelihood that
126. See generally Gretchen Mortgensen, FAIR GAME; Home Loans: A Nightmare Grows
Darker,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at Bl.
127. See supra Section II.B (discussing yield spread premiums and disparate impact theory).

FALL

2011 ]

FairLending 2.0

137

an individual borrower will repay a loan based on her race."" The
compounding effect of these preferences creates a lending environment that discriminates against minority borrowers. Although
banks and lending companies are legally responsible for the actions of their employees, the current approach to fair lending has
proven ineffective because it relies on pressuring lenders to change
employee behavior. Rather than relying on lenders to end the biases of their agents, fair lending laws should empower borrowers to
identify and respond to discrimination.
2. Fair Lending Laws Are Focused on the Past
The existing Fair Lending Laws look to the past in their efforts
to curb discrimination by lenders. As a result, these Fair Lending
Laws must constantly chase whatever new iteration of lending that
lenders may devise. Additionally, the primary recourse provided by
Fair Lending Laws-a private cause of action for damages-only
addresses past discrimination and thus is ineffective in proactively
preventing discrimination.
Under the existing Fair Lending Laws, the process for a borrower who has experienced lending discrimination to achieve a just
resolution is lengthy, generally because of delays inherent in the
legal system. This lapse of time often has disastrous and irreversible
effects on individual borrowers and, in some cases, entire neighborhoods. From the time the discrimination is identified until the
time the litigation is resolved and a lender changes the disputed
policy-often lasting a period of several years-other borrowers
may have both received similarly discriminatory loans and some
may even have lost their homes to foreclosure. Even if, as a result
128.

See

INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RA-

(Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne Y Stith &
Alan R. Nelson eds., 2003) (indicating that there is "considerable empirical evidence that
even well-meaning whites who are not overtly biased and who do not believe that they are
prejudiced typically demonstrate unconscious implicit negative racial attitudes and stereotypes" when interacting with others); see alsoJANET E. HELMS, INTRODUCTION: REVIEW OF
CIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 10

RACIAL IDENTITY TERMINOLOGY, BLACK & WHITE RACIAL IDENTITY: THEORY, RESEARCH,

AND PRACTICE 3, 7 (Janet E. Helms ed., 1990) ("Race consciousness refers to the aware-

ness that (socialization due to) racial-group membership can influence one's intrapsychic
dynamics as well as interpersonal relationships. Thus, one's racial awareness may be
subliminal and not readily admitted into consciousness or it may be conscious and not
readily repressed."); Sara James, Nightline: Testing for a Hidden Racial Bias: Mistakes Volunteers Make in Computerized Test are Revealing (NBC television broadcast Apr. 15, 2007),
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18122831/ns/dateline nbc/t/testing-hiddenracial-bias (finding that "even unconscious racial biases may affect your behavior ...
[and] when it comes to the potent question of race, our subconscious is making decisions
everyday. They're decisions that in real time in real life have real consequences.").
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of litigation, the lender eventually modifies the discriminatory
loans, each month that a family struggles with an onerous loan can
have a significant impact on its emotional and financial health.2
These harms indicate the clear need for an approach to fair lending that identifies and rectifies discrimination more rapidly and
aims to prevent, rather than redress, the negative consequences of
such loans.

III. DODD-FRANK PERPETUATES

THE OUTDATED APPROACH

To FAIR LENDING
The primary aim of the July 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is to regulate the way banks
and bankers do business.9 0 However, two articles toward the end of
the act create significant changes to the mortgage industry and are
an important addition to the Fair Lending Laws. Article X of
Dodd-Frank amends HMDA to require gathering of additional data about borrowers.13 ' Article XIV creates a duty for mortgage
originators to verify that borrowers will be able to repay their loans;
thus, limiting the incentive to steer borrowers towards subprime
loan products.12 These changes to mortgage lending are not focused on ending racial discrimination, but rather on ensuring that
the loan products sold by the mortgage industry are better products for the borrowers who use them and the investors that rely on
them."' The changes brought about by Dodd-Frank are significant
and will certainly bring about fairer lending. However, they also
perpetuate the existing ineffective approach to fair lending, and
thus will ultimately be unable to entirely eliminate lending discrimination.
129. See generally Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing
Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 175th Cong. (2001), availableat
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg82969/html/CHRG-107shrg82969.htm.
130. 156 CONG. REc. S4067 (daily ed. May 20, 2010) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (stating
that Dodd-Frank is designed to "protect consumers from unfair, deceptive and abusive financial products and practices" and "to insure that when families apply for a mortgage, a
bank loan or other complicated financial products, they will also receive clear information
that they need to make the best decision possible. With a watchdog in place, families will be
less likely to enter into mortgages they don't understand or be a victim of unfair and deceptive loan practices. It will increase fairness and help reduce the casino atmosphere of too
many financial products.").
131. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §§ 1001-1100, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2113 (2010).
132. Id. §§ 1400-1498.
133. 156 CONG. REc. H5229 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Sen. Hare) ("This
bill is a landmark achievement ... [and] dedicated to ensuring that bank loans, mortgages,
and credit cards are fair, affordable, understandable, and, most importantly, transparent.").
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A. Dodd-FrankArticle X: IncreasedDisclosure underHMDA
As discussed in Part I, borrower and loan data disclosed under
HMDA is critical to demonstrating discrimination in litigation under the traditional Fair Lending Laws. However, significant gaps in
the data have hampered litigants' ability to isolate membership in a
protected class as the determinative factor in the outcome of a loan
application. Amendments to HMDA under Section 1094 of DoddFrank seek to close some of those holes.
The amendments to HMDA require that lenders report more
detailed borrower characteristics as well as a clear description of
the loan product sold. In addition to race, ethnicity, sex, and income, lenders are now required to record and report the age and
credit score of the borrower, the census tract of the mortgaged
property, and the value of the property to be pledged as collateral
under the loan.

The disparate impact standard under the Fl-A requires a more
robust statistical analysis than was possible with previous HMDA
data, which lacked creditworthiness information. These new reporting requirements may permit an accurate comparison among
borrowers and let researchers and litigants see which borrower attributes are correlated with subprime and other onerous loan
products. It may even allow researchers and litigants to demonstrate discrimination using HMDA data alone, rather than having
to combine data from other sources. Increased information about
the loan product combined with a more complete borrower profile
will permit researchers and litigants to see which types of borrowers end up with which types of loans and will provide the data
required to prove such connections conclusively. Additionally, the
ability to find proof of disparate impact within reported data will
remove the significant barriers to entry for disparate impact claims
under either the FH4A or EOCA.
Dodd-Frank also requires that lenders provide greater information about the proposed loan product. They must report "total
points and fees payable at origination;" the annual percentage rate
for the loan as compared to all loans by the lender; any prepayment penalties associated with the loan; the number of months
after which the interest rate may change; "payments other than
fully amortizing payments during any portion of the loan term;"
the term of the loan; and the "channel through which application
was made, including retail, broker, and other relevant

134.

Dodd-Frank Act

§

1094.
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categories.", 5 Although these new reporting requirements apply to
all loans, they are specifically geared toward presenting a more
complete picture of "exotic" or onerous loan products and terms,
particularly those that involve increased closing costs or prepayment penalties.1 3 6
B. Dodd-FrankArticle XIV Changes to Mortgage Origination

Whereas the changes brought about by Dodd-Frank Article X
seek to provide the data necessary to determine which types of
borrowers receive which loan products, Article XIV significantly
alters the types of loan products available as well as the relationship
between mortgage originators and borrowers in the home lending
process.1 37 Dodd-Frank seeks to ensure that "consumers are offered
and receive residential mortgages loans on terms that reasonably
reflect their ability to repay the loans and that are understandable
and not unfair, deceptive or abusive."'3 The result is less flexibility
for mortgage brokers and loan officers to steer borrowers toward
inferior or onerous loan products.
In general, the new provisions require the mortgage originator,
and in some cases the lending institution, to share the burden that
traditionally was borne solely by the borrower-namely to ensure
that a loan is fair and that a borrower can repay it. Previously, because of information asymmetries and bank lending policies, both
insidious and benign, many borrowers could not ensure that they
were receiving a fair loan. Article XIV of Dodd-Frank shifts this
balance between lenders and borrowers so that the mortgage market is fair and more sustainable.
Article XIV creates a broad definition of "mortgage originator"
that includes any person who receives compensation for taking a
loan application, assisting a consumer in obtaining a loan, preparing loan packages, collecting information on available loans for a
consumer, or negotiating loan offers or terms for a consumer.139
Article XIV also eliminates the incentive for loan originators to
steer consumers towards more onerous loan products by mandating that compensation to mortgage originators, from any direct or
indirect source, may not vary "based on the terms of the loan (oth135. Id.
136. Id.
137. The changes are brought about by an amendment to the Truth in Lending Act,
which regulates a lender's responsibility to the borrower. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1400-1498.
138. Id. § 1402.
139. Id. § 1401 (cc) (2).
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er than the amount of principal)."'m In other words, brokers can
no longer be paid based on the loan terms that they encourage a
borrower to accept. The new law also bans "yield spread premiums." 4 ' Such premiums have been consistently shown to be disdiscriminatory toward minority borrowers.
Article XIV also instructs the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe
regulations to prohibit "mortgage originators from steering any
consumer to a residential mortgage loan" if "the consumer lacks a
reasonable ability to repay," the loan "has predatory characteristics
or effects (such as equity stripping, excessive fees, or abusive
terms)," or is not a "qualified mortgage" and the consumer qualifies for a "qualified mortgage." 4 3 More generally, the regulations
will forbid any lending practice that promotes "disparities among
consumers of equal credit worthiness but of different race, ethnicity, gender or age."' 4 4 This wording provides an implicit approval of
disparate impact theory.
In addition to the rights of action already contained within the
existing Fair Lending Laws, Dodd-Frank creates a new private right
of action for the violation of the laws against steering and predatory lending. A violation can result in treble damages, calculated
using the amount of the mortgage originators' compensation plus
the costs of the action, including attorney's fees.4 4 Although the
new private right of action does not enforce the ability-to-repay
provisions, Dodd-Frank does allow borrowers to raise any violation
of such provisions in foreclosure proceedings and to seek a recoupment or offset for the damages of such a violation. 4 6
Under Dodd-Frank, the Federal Reserve Bank must also create
regulations to prohibit mortgage originators from "mischaracterizing [the] credit history of a consumer," mischaracterizing or
supporting the mischaracterization of the "appraised value of the
property," or discouraging a consumer from trying to find a better
loan from another mortgage originator. 4 7 Section 1411 of Article
XIV also creates new minimum standards for all mortgages. No
140. Id. § 1403(c)(1).
141. See supra Section II.B (discussing yield spread premiums and disparate impact theory).
142. BoCIAN, ERNST & Li, supra note 26, at 21.
143. Dodd-Frank Act § 1412. A qualified mortgage is defined as any residential mortgage loan where the regular periodic payments for the loan does not increase the principal
balance or allow the consumer to defer repayment of principal (with some exceptions), and
has points and fees that total less than 3 percent of the total loan amount.
144. Id. § 1403.
145. Id. § 1404.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 1403.
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mortgage loan can be made unless the lender makes a "reasonable
and good faith determination based on verified and documented
information" that the borrower has the ability to repay the loan,
taxes, and insurance." In making such a determination, the lender
must use a fully amortizing payment schedule and not merely an
interest only or introductory rate payment schedule, regardless of
the loan product.'49 These provisions not only limit the ability of
borrowers to accept loans that they cannot afford, but also give investors some baseline confidence that the mortgage-backed
securities they invest in have met a minimum standard of underwriting and a reasonable expectation that the securities will retain
value. Additionally, these requirements seek to push lenders away
from exotic loan products and toward "qualified mortgage" products by exempting qualified mortgages from the onerous
requirement that lenders closely scrutinize the borrower's ability to
repay.
The changes to the lending environment made by Dodd-Frank
provide significant new protections for all borrowers. The new law
also provides tools to better understand the mortgage lending
market and the persistent discrimination that results in disparate
impact on minority borrowers. Yet, while significant and promising,
these changes do not alter the existing approach to fair lending,
which remains unable to end discrimination. Certainly, the law
identified and remedied existing problems in the mortgage market-such as steering, prepayment penalties, and yield spread
premiums-and tightens up data reported under HMDA. However, loan products are continuously evolving and lenders will
inevitably create new terms and exotic loan products that are not
covered by the new law. So long as the approach to fair lending
focuses solely on lenders and on the past, a truly fair lending environment will always be just out of reach.
Although this Article argues that the current approach to
providing fair lending is outdated and will not alone eliminate discrimination in lending, it must also be acknowledged that the
traditional Fair Lending Laws do remain important and relevant.
These laws serve as backstop to the most egregious cases of lending
discrimination. The HMDA, in particular, continues to provide invaluable information that permits researchers to understand and
draw conclusions about housing and lending that would otherwise
be impossible. Thus, any new approach to fair lending must build
from, rather than entirely replace, the existing laws.
148.
149.

Id. § 1411.
Id.
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IV. FAIR LENDING 2.0

A. A Borrower-BasedApproach to FairLending
The preceding Parts of this Article have outlined the traditional
Fair Lending Laws, described the way each works, and explained
why they alone will not end racial discrimination in mortgage lending. The approach to fair lending that was created in response to
concern for minorities' ability to participate in the mortgage market at all has demonstrated an inability to adequately address the
quality of that participation. In contrast, a genuinely fair lending
environment demands that similarly situated borrowers receive
similar loan products.
This Part proposes an entirely new borrower-based approach to
mortgage lending that is focused on empowering borrowers and
enabling them to find a loan that meets their borrowing needs and
is free of discrimination. This borrower-based model is built on
three principles: increasing access to a variety of lenders; reducing
complexity of loan products; and providing borrowers with the
necessary tools to analyze, understand, and compare loan offers.
Each of these principles is discussed below. This Part also discusses
several tools that should be used to implement this new approach,
including a loan price tag, a reverse auction, and loan comparison
report.
1. Clear and Comparable Loan Offers
The ability to effectively compare the cost of one product to another is essential to any thoughtful transaction and is particularly
critical when buying a home loan. Entering into a mortgage with a
lender is one of the most significant transactions in a person's lifetime, and yet most borrowers do not have the financial
sophistication to understand the potential ramifications of the loan
terms they accept, especially when such terms depend on future
events such as a change in interest rate.10 Any new borrower-based
approach must create tools that permit borrowers to effectively
understand and compare one loan offer to another.
Increasingly complex loan products, discussed below, and borrowers' reliance on heuristics, or mental short-cuts, rather than
purely wealth-maximizing rational decision making create
150. See Lauren E. Willis, Decision making and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price,65 MD. L. REv. 707, 753 (2006).
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impediments to a borrower's ability to understand loan products.5'
The current legal regime "fails to effectively facilitate price shopping because it is based on an unrealistic, rational actor model of
borrower behavior." 5 In other words, laws designed to protect borrowers assume that, no matter how fine the print or complicated
the loan product, disclosure will allow the borrower to understand
and rationally analyze the loan offer, compare it to other loan offers she has received, and make a well reasoned decision as to
which loan best serves her needs. In reality, particularly in subprime lending, this is far from the case. Even when lenders disclose
all relevant provisions of the loan, studies show that borrowers frequently accept loans that are not in their self-interest.'53 Potential
borrowers frequently experience two common subconscious decision making failures: a desire to minimize the "cognitive effort and
resources spent on decision making" as well as the negative feelings that may result from decision-making. 54 Such tendencies can
"short circuit" a person's rational analysis of a loan offer and lead
them to make a decision based only on few relevant factors. For
example, a borrower might focus solely on the introductory
monthly payment amount, or rely too heavily on a friendly salesperson's assessment of what is in the borrower's best interest.
New borrower-based fair lending tools must reflect the limits of a
borrower's technical, rational, and emotional ability to seek out
and identify the loan that is in his best interest. Such tools should
provide a borrower with information that fits within her identified
decision-making strengths and enables her to effectively choose a
loan that is right for her.
2. Reduce Complexity in Loan Products
The loan products that are currently available can be extremely
complex. As a result of this complexity, the true financial cost of
many loans is not clear to the borrower at the time they enter into
the transaction. As a result, a borrower-based approach requires
the simplification of loan products. A borrower must be able to
understand and appreciate all the possible ramifications of entering into a loan and to compare a range of available loan options.
As discussed above, Dodd-Frank takes a few small steps toward a
less complex lending environment by requiring the Federal Re151.
152.
153.
154.

See generally id.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 755-56.
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serve Bank to ban the most predatory terms and to reduce the incentive to steer borrowers toward more complex and costly loans.
A genuinely borrower-based approach, however, requires that loans
be limited to only a few simple terms that convey the full financial
outcome. Simpler loans will help prevent lenders from manipulatand
ing a borrower's cognitive and emotional weaknesses1
facilitate effective price shopping and comparison.
3. Maximize Access to a Variety of Lenders
In addition to simplifying both the process for borrowers and
the loan products themselves, a new borrower-based approach
must also provide each borrower with maximum access to a variety
of lenders. As discussed in the sections above, many minority borrowers live in neighborhoods that have few lending institutions.
Other minority borrowers that have access to a greater variety of
lenders are still steered toward subprime and other more costly
loan products. Still others access credit exclusively through highcost channels that ignore prime loans, regardless of the borrower's
credit profile. Each of these outcomes is, in part, the result of a
scarcity of real and accessible loan options for borrowers. This
scarcity is a significant contributing factor to the persistent
discrimination in lending discussed herein. Tools based upon a
borrower-based approach need to provide borrowers easier access
to a variety of lenders, show lenders the underserved markets that
exist, and employ the efficiencies of the Internet without relying
on an individual borrower's Internet literacy.
My proposed borrower-based approach to achieving fair lending
does not rely on the effectiveness of regulation and litigation alone
to bring about a change in the behavior of lenders. Rather, this
new approach relies on providing borrowers with a more efficient
interaction with the lending market in order to guarantee loans
that are free of discrimination. All borrowers, not just racial minorities, must have access to a variety of lenders and the tools
necessary to compare mortgage offers.

B. Borrower-BasedFairLending Tools
Above, this Article laid out three principles of a borrower-based
approach to fair lending, namely clear and comparable loan offers,
155.

Id.
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reducing the complexity of loan products, and creating the
maximum access to a variety of lenders. The sections below discuss
three tools, derived from the three principles of my borrowerbased approach, which will help to create a fair lending environment. These sections examine two tools suggested by other fair
lending scholars that incorporate my borrower-based fair lending
principles, and also suggest a new strategy to end discrimination in
lending.
1. The Loan Price Tag
Lauren Willis has proposed that all loan products be required to
contain a "Loan Price Tag."" 6 Willis has identified four loan terms
that should be included in the creation of this loan price tag: (1)
total loan proceeds; (2) total up-front fees, points, and costs
(whether financed or not financed); (3) the maximum monthly
payment; and (4) the loan length in years.5 7 Taken together the
four loan terms describe all of the possible financial outcomes of a
loan. As a result, "prepayment penalties," as well as "balloons and
negative amortization" would be prohibited as the financial outcome of such products could not be communicated in the four
terms.'5 Once this price tag is attached and the four terms clearly
expressed, it should constitute a locked offer from the lender that
the borrower can then compare directly with other loan offers. 5"
This simplified way of explaining the relevant loan terms, particularly if combined with a reduction in the complexity of the
actual loan products, would permit borrowers to avoid the heuristic biases and coping mechanisms that so often land borrowers in
loans that are contrary to their best-interest. Thus, the loan price
tag represents a significant step towards creating simpler loans that
permit borrows to compare loan offers and thus would contribute
well to the borrower-based approach to fair lending.
2. The Reverse Auction
Willis' proposed "reverse auction competition" also fits well with
a borrower-focused approach to ending racial discrimination in
lending. This auction would occur among lenders who would
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 821.
Id.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 823-24.
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compete for the borrowers' business. The system would be facilitated through a government agency, possibly the Department of
Housing and Urban Development16" Once a loan price tag is applied to a loan offer, the offering lender would transmit the offer
and all other borrower information to a website coordinated by
this agency. This online database would allow other lenders to see
the offer and to use that information to mail competing loan offers
to the borrower."' Combined with the loan price tag, such a process would not only give borrowers the tools to price shop, but
would also provide borrowers with alternative loan options. Additionally, the reverse auction competition among lenders could end
"lending deserts"-areas where there are no prime lending institutions-because the reverse auction would be online and lenders
could participate from any location. 6 2 Like the loan price tag, the
reverse auction would represent a significant advance toward creating a more competitive lending environment.
3. A New Borrower-Based Fair Lending Tool:
The Loan Comparison Report
Although Willis' proposals represent helpful borrower-based
tools, these alone are not sufficient to create a fair lending environment. As a result, this Article proposes that lenders should be
required to provide all borrowers with a clear and understandable
loan comparison report. Such a report should take the form of a
concise graphic that compares the cost of the loan offered to a particular borrower to loans closed by other borrowers of similar
credit profiles. Providing a borrower with this report would increase her ability to immediately identify a bad or discriminatory
loan offer and use this information to decide whether to close the
loan or to walk away. Such disclosure would need to occur sufficiently before the loan closing date to allow the opportunity to
back out of the loan or to shop with other lenders while still maintaining a reasonable home purchase timeline.
An online database administered by a government agency, preferably the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and
accessible by mortgage originators should be created to administer
a loan comparison report. The database should be populated with
anonymous borrower information collected at the time of loan
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 825.
Id.
See id. at 825-26.
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closings, including borrower credit profiles and the basic terms of
the loan product they received. Upon the approval of a new application for a loan, the lender would be required to enter the new
borrower information into the database. The database would then
populate a report and graphic indicating how the cost of the loan
product offered to the borrower compares to the loan products
received by other borrowers with similar creditworthiness profiles.
The lender should be required to disclose this loan comparison
report to the borrower.
The reporting method in the loan comparison report could be
as simple as comparing the annual percentage rating (APR) of the
loan offered to a new borrower to the APRs of loans taken by other
borrowers with similar credit profiles. However, using APR may
create some problems given that "only 10% of recent home loan
borrowers understand APR well enough to know that it is higher
than the note interest rate."1 63 For those borrowers who do not
understand APR, and to avoid adding complexity to the loan offer,
the loan comparison report could take a form similar to the wellknown EnergyGuide stickers that are required for many large
appliances. These stickers compare the power usage of a particular
appliance to others in its class. Thus, the loan comparison report
could express the APR of the borrowers loan offer simply as "much
lower than average," "lower than average," "about average," "higher than average" or "much higher than average." An example of
how the loan comparison report could look when presented to the
borrower is illustrated below:
LOAN COST COMPARISON REPORT

This report compares the loan offered to you by your lender to the loans
purchasedby other borrowers with credit similarto yours.
Your Loan Offer

Much Higher
Than Average

Much Lower
Than Average

Average Cost of Loans Made
to Similar Borrowers

163.

Id. at 822.
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Result: The cost of the loan offered to you is much higher than
the average loan made to other borrowers with creditworthiness
characteristics similar to yours. You are likely to find other lenders
willing to offer you a less expensive loan.
The comparison report should not be provided only to borrowers with membership in a protected class, but should instead
include all borrowers and be produced every time a lender accepts
an application for any mortgage loan. The provision of loan comparison information neutralizes the role of race, gender, or other
protected status in the lending process. The loan comparison
merely identifies whether similarly situated borrowers end up with
similar loan products. If the report indicates that the loan offered
to a particular borrower is significantly more expensive than those
offered to other similarly situated borrowers, then, regardless of
whether the reason for the less favorable terms was discriminatory
or not, the borrower can either knowingly accept the less favorable
terms or, preferably, avoid the transaction entirely. Thus, by using
the loan comparison report, individual borrowers can enforce fair
lending practices before loan transactions are final. This is a much
more efficient solution than the old model that relies on enforcement by regulatory agencies or litigation by aggrieved borrowers
years after the data has been produced.

a. Benefits of a Loan Comparison Report

One important benefit of a loan comparison report is that, unlike the current fair lending regime, it will permit the enforcement
of fair lending beyond any one particular lender. Allegations of
discriminatory practices, disparate treatment, or disparate impact
are, by their nature, based on a comparison of one borrower to
another and thus cannot extend beyond a particular lender's portfolio. For example, a litigant can only argue that a single lender
treats its black borrowers differently than its white borrowers.
However, evidence from the recent housing crisis suggests that certain lenders set up operations exclusively in black or minority
neighborhoods. These methods make it difficult for a black borrower to prove discrimination if the lender's portfolio contains few
or no white borrowers. The loan comparison report would take a
new loan beyond the confines of a particular lender's portfolio,
where discrimination might not be evident, and permit comparison to a more general class of borrowers.
If created correctly, the database of borrower and loan information could work in tandem with the current reporting
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requirements under HMDA. Much of the information that must be
collected under HMDA following the Dodd-Frank amendments is
relevant to the production of a loan comparison report. Similarly,
once the loan comparison data from the lenders is captured and
stored, the production of quarterly and annual HMDA reports
would be a simple process.
Another important benefit of a loan comparison report is that
the lending market, rather than regulators, would play a greater
role in ensuring fair lending compliance. Some argue that the unregulated market could solve the problem of discrimination in
lending, asserting that if a lender is charging a minority borrower a
premium based solely on race, then a competing lender should
present itself and offer a less expensive product.164 However, research has shown that in practice such a result does not occur, and
that many minority communities interact with lenders in near isolation, which results in the "channeling" described in Part I.S" In
contrast, my proposed loan comparison report would take the borrower's credit profile out of the individual community or
neighborhood and compare it to the broader market containing a
greater number of competitive lenders. As a result, borrower decisions based on the loan comparison report would be a more
efficient market-based solution to fair lending than simply relying
on lenders to identify and enter underserved markets.

b. Weaknesses of a Loan ComparisonReport

Reliance on a loan comparison report alone assumes that a particular borrower has access to the broader marketplace of lenders.
A borrower's ability to turn the information provided in the loan
comparison report into a fair loan is only as good as her ability to
find a competing lender willing to give the terms that the report
identifies as the market rate for her credit profile. As discussed in
Part II, many minority borrowers who should qualify for prime
loans end up with subprime products because of the channels they
use to enter the mortgage market. In many minority neighborhoods those subprime loan channels are the only channels
available.' Despite this drawback, the report could be an effective
tool for borrowers with limited access to prime lending channels.
164.
165.

See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
See GARY A. DYMSKI, DISCRIMINATION IN THE CREDIT AND HOUSING MARKETS:
FINDINGS AND CHALLENGES 24-25 (2005), available at http://economics.ucr.edu/papers/
papers02/02-18.pdf.
166. See supra Section I.G.

FALL

2011 ]

FairLending 2. 0

151

Once borrowers are made aware of the exact cost of their neighborhood's isolation from traditional lenders, they may be more
willing to venture beyond the brokers and subprime lenders in
their particular neighborhood and to attempt to access the broader lending market. Additionally, they may be more motivated to
seek out additional lenders over the Internet.
Admittedly, the loan comparison report alone may be of limited
use to an individual borrower if she is both geographically and
technologically constrained from accessing multiple lenders. However, the data collected would still serve as instant evidence of a
particular lender's discriminatory policies and allow for traditional
fair lending scrutiny by regulators and litigants. Additionally, the
comparison reports would identify underserved markets that traditional lenders could enter, creating the very market necessary for
competitive loans. Still, the reverse auction system described above
would neutralize this issue entirely by taking the market online,
rather than waiting for lenders to enter new areas.
Another potential drawback is rooted in the strong correlation
between race, wealth, and creditworthiness in the United States.
This correlation raises the concern that the loan comparison report regime might be self-defeating. Minorities, who are
disproportionately represented among the poor,"' less creditworthy, and generally the recipients of worse loan products, might
skew the comparison reports for all low-income and less creditworthy borrowers. This may even create a progressively worse lending
environment for these classes of borrowers. Although the correlation between racial minorities and poor credit may generally be
accurate, a fair lending regime is only concerned with the instances in which the correlation is wrong. For example, if minority
borrowers as a class are generally less creditworthy, a fair lending
regime should ensure that minority borrowers that have above average credit receive appropriate loan offers. The comparison
report would permit these borrowers to identify and avoid discrimination. Without the comparison reports they might be
unknowingly lumped in with the less creditworthy solely because of
race. Additionally, the comparison report would merely be an
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instrument to ensure parity among borrowers within a certain
credit profile and would not indicate whether a loan is a "good
deal" or "bad deal" for a borrower. The comparison report itself
would do nothing to prevent lenders from giving all borrowers
with bad credit a bad loan product-even if the majority of such
borrowers are minorities. That said, by creating a forum for borrowers, lenders, and the public to identify the types of loan
products available to certain credit profiles, enterprising lenders
could identify those credit profiles where borrowers were paying in
excess of the risk they posed and compete by offering better products.
Even if the lending market did not respond to the comparison
reports by offering the best possible loan commensurate with the
risk it poses, at a minimum the comparison reports would indicate
when race played a role in determining the loan price. Currently, if
a borrower receives an onerous loan, it is unclear to what extent
her race and her creditworthiness each affected the outcome.
However, once a comparison report indicates a mismatch between
borrower creditworthiness and the offered loan product, race will
become apparent as the determinative variable in the loan product
outcome. Policy makers can then use this data to determine
whether the loan products given to a particular credit profile are a
"good deal" or "bad deal" and take appropriate action.

CONCLUSION

Even with the adoption of the tools discussed herein, there is a
clear need for the traditional Fair Lending Laws to continue to
play an important role in the home lending environment. By relying on these laws we have made significant and seemingly
permanent moves toward eliminating racial discrimination. The
existing Fair Lending Laws have taken us from a time when minority borrowers were completely excluded by mortgage lenders to the
present when black borrowers are an integral part of the lending
market. We cannot afford to lose the momentum. Thus, the Fair
Lending Laws must remain as a permanent backstop.
The traditional Fair Lending Laws have proven unable to root
out the subtle discrimination in lending experienced by minority
borrowers. The current nature of this discrimination is such that
the old approach that focused exclusively on lenders and on rectifying past wrongs will not work. Unfortunately, even the significant
changes to fair lending law made under Dodd-Frank perpetuate
the old approach and thus will not produce a lending environment
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that is meaningfully different or less discriminatory. We must not,
however, be satisfied until lending occurs without any regard to
race, gender, or membership in any other protected class. As a result, a new approach to fair lending is urgently needed: a model
that recognizes that the resolution to discrimination will not come
from policing lenders, but instead from empowering borrowers. It
is the new borrower-based lending framework that can take us this
last mile toward a fair lending environment.
Only a borrower-based solution can address persistent and subtle discrimination in lending. Such an approach must focus on
simplifying loans, increasing borrower access to mortgage offers
from a range of lenders, and empowering borrowers to compare
multiple loan offers. This new borrower-based approach can be
realized through borrower-based tools such as the loan price tag,
the reverse auction, and the loan comparison report.
The loan comparison report proposed here will help correct
the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers and
better employ the market to allow borrowers to identify lending
discrimination the very moment it occurs, thereby enabling them
to refuse unfair loans. Although this solution is admittedly imperfect, it still promises to make a significant contribution toward
achieving a fair lending environment. Adopting this new approach to addressing lingering discrimination will also open the
door-and the dialogue-to other solutions for addressing disparate impact discrimination in fair lending, and perhaps,
discrimination generally.

